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Life and Afterlife
in the Steel Seizure Case
MATTHEW STEILEN †
ABSTRACT
This Essay examines the proper role of the Supreme Court
in deciding disputes between Congress and the President.
Progressive commentators are now urging the Court to
dismiss these cases as political questions, at least where doing
so would give effect to congressional regulations of the
President. The Court’s interference is criticized as antidemocratic. This Essay advances a different conception of the
Supreme Court’s role by examining the famous Steel Seizure
Case. In that case, the Court upheld an injunction barring
President Truman from seizing the nation’s steel mills, on
grounds that doing so was inconsistent with congressional
will and without any basis in the President’s independent
constitutional authority. The subsequent embrace of Justice
Jackson’s concurrence shows how Supreme Court decisions
†Professor, University at Buffalo School of Law. This Essay derives from remarks
given at an event in February 2022 in celebration of Justice Jackson’s 130th
birthday. Thanks to the Jackson Center and to President Kristan McMahon for
the invitation, and to Gerard Magliocca, Julian Davis Mortenson, and Robert
Tsai for guidance. John Q. Barrett also shared some of his unmatched expertise
on Justice Jackson. Thanks as well to my editors at the Buffalo Law Review,
Patrick Callahan and Matthew Mason, who contributed some crucial, late-game
research assistance.
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can have an effect outside the immediate confines or “life” of
a case. In its “afterlife”—its use by members of Congress,
officers and employees in the executive branch, and legal
educators and other members of the public—Jackson’s
concurrence has acquired a kind of democratic authority. In
Congress, for example, it was quoted in legislative debates
preceding the passage of the War Powers Resolution, the
National Emergencies Act, and the Presidential Recordings
and Materials Preservation Act, among other statutes. Justice
Jackson’s broad, theoretical language and flexible framework
proved useful to legislators seeking to regulate the President.
By constructing his concurrence this way, Jackson helped to
give it a central place in structuring the political maintenance
of our Constitution’s separation of powers.
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INTRODUCTION
What is the Supreme Court’s role in enforcing the
Constitution’s separation of powers? A central precedent for
answering that question is Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, commonly called the Steel Seizure Case, in which the
Court sustained an injunction against President Truman’s
seizure of the nation’s steel mills, on grounds that it was
inconsistent with congressional will and without any basis in
the President’s independent constitutional authority. 1 I want
to take another look at the case. But rather than focus on the
historical context or the Justices’ opinions, as able scholars
have already done, I want to widen the frame and consider
how the opinions were subsequently put to use by others. My
hope is to illustrate a general principle, which I think
probable, though I will not attempt to prove it here: that how
judicial opinions are used over time is of far greater
consequence in maintaining a separation of powers than
what the Court did or said in the immediate context of a case.
I take this to be a reason for the Supreme Court not to
dismiss cases of interbranch conflict like the Steel Seizure
Case, but to reach the substantive issues and provide robust
written opinions. Crucially, our use, off the Court, of the
justices’ written handiwork is not necessarily subject to the
criticism, often voiced against the Court itself, of being antimajoritarian or anti-democratic. 2
To see the idea, consider Chief Justice Vinson’s opinion
in the Steel Seizure Case. Justice Vinson dissented in the
case and would have upheld President Truman’s seizure as
a means of supplying war materiel for the conflict in Korea. 3
Vinson’s opinion got only three votes. The opinion for the
1. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S.
579, 584–89 (1952).
2. For a recent, compelling example of this criticism, see generally Nikolas
Bowie & Daphna Renan, The Separation-of-Powers Counterrevolution, 131 YALE
L.J. 2020 (2022).
3. See Steel Seizure Case, 343 U.S. at 667 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting).
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Court, authored by Justice Black, garnered six votes, making
the Chief’s loss decisive. But though he lost the case, Vinson’s
opinion gave voice to deep ideas about executive power that
have continued to attract significant interest. Thus, in a 2006
essay, law professors Jack Goldsmith and John Manning
described a constitutional “completion power,” which they
defined as a power in the President to “prescribe incidental
details needed to carry into execution a legislative scheme,
even in the absence of any congressional authorization.” 4 The
“most comprehensive statement” of this power was to be
found, they wrote, in Vinson’s Steel Seizure dissent. 5
The arc of Vinson’s opinion from dissent to law is an
example of what I call the “afterlife” of a case. The “life” of a
case ends with what the Court sets down—what judgment it
enters, what law it pronounces. Then begins its “afterlife,” in
which the broader legal community, the Congress, the
President and the administration, courts of all types, later
Supreme Courts, and even the public at large, take up the
justices’ writings, and make use of what the justices set
down. The law is not only what is set down; the law is, over
the long run, also what is taken up.
I suspect there are many examples of how the law taken
up has changed the law set down—or even displaced it
entirely. 6 The seven opinions in the Steel Seizure Case
certainly provide more than one illustration. Over time,
Justice Black’s opinion for the Court has receded in
importance, while others have advanced. Though it is hard
to predict which opinions will be taken up (for much the same
reason that the future is hard to predict), the different fates
of the Steel Seizure opinions do suggest some ideas about
when an opinion is more likely to have future value for us

4. Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The President’s Completion Power,
115 YALE L.J. 2280, 2282–83 (2006).
5. Id. at 2282.
6. For a general theory of American Constitutional Law along these lines,
see DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 33–49 (2010).
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users of the law. At the very least, we can be confident in
concluding that not all opinions are the same. How they are
crafted matters.
This point is important for considering the prospect of
Supreme Court reform. The appointment of Amy Coney
Barrett to the Court in 2020 touched off a wave of anxiety
among progressives about the number of its Justices
appointed by Republican Presidents, who now outnumbered
Democratic appointees six-to-three. 7 In 2021, President
Biden commissioned a blue-ribbon panel to study reform,
though it declined to endorse any of the proposals generally
favored by progressives, like adding seats to the Court or
stripping it of jurisdiction or the power of judicial review. 8
Yet the leak of a draft opinion for the Court in Dobbs v.
Jackson’s Women’s Health Organization, which would
overturn Roe v. Wade, appears to portend progressives’ worst
fear: that an emboldened conservative Court will eliminate
cherished constitutional protections. 9
The idea that adding seats to the Supreme Court will
protect individual rights tends to reduce constitutional law
to vote-counting. But the history explored here shows that
vote-counting does not exhaust the Court’s contribution to
our law. Opinion-measuring is also important. By “opinionmeasuring,” I mean judging whether an opinion is a good
one, all things considered—whether it is right for the times,
7. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, The Precedent, and Perils, of Court Packing, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 12, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/12/us/supreme-courtpacking.html.
8. See Exec. Order No. 14,023, 86 Fed. Reg. 19,569, 19,569–70 (Apr. 14, 2021)
(forming the Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United
States); PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON THE S. CT. OF THE U.S., FINAL REPORT (Dec. 8,
2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/SCOTUS-Rep
ort-Final-12.8.21-1.pdf.
9. On Dobbs and Roe, see Josh Gerstein & Alexander Ward, Supreme Court
Has Voted to Overturn Abortion Rights, Draft Opinion Shows, POLITICO (May 2,
2022, 8:32 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2022/05/02/supreme-court-abor
tion-draft-opinion-00029473; Adam Liptak, Critical Moment for Roe, and the
Supreme Court’s Legitimacy, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com
/2021/12/04/us/politics/mississippi-supreme-court-abortion-roe-v-wade.html.
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whether it speaks a truth. Taking the measure of an opinion
is not something the Court can do for itself. It depends on the
judgment of folks off the Court, now and in the future. So,
though appointees of Democratic Presidents are
outnumbered on today’s Supreme Court, a liberal opinion
that is well-written, vigorously argued, and sensitive to the
world outside the courtroom may end up being more
persuasive and contributing more to our law than a majority
opinion backed by six, seven, or even eight votes. If we stop
focusing on who has the most votes and turn our attention to
who writes the best opinions, then it is not obvious that the
Supreme Court suffers from imbalance and would benefit
from packing, at least in the long run.
I want to turn now to the most famous of the opinions in
the Steel Seizure Case, the concurrence of Justice Robert H.
Jackson. I want to ask: What was the afterlife of Jackson’s
opinion? How did it go from being one of seven opinions in
the case, attracting support from not a single of his
colleagues, to being regarded today as the fundamental
statement of our Constitution’s separation of powers? 10
The remainder of this Essay has two parts: “Life” and
“Afterlife.” In Part One, “Life,” I consider the factual
background of the case, the state of the doctrine of separation
of powers at the time it came before the Court, and aspects
of the Justices’ opinions. Since this is familiar ground, my
aim here is not to be exhaustive, but to emphasize features
of the context and the case that are relevant for
understanding its afterlife. In Part Two, “Afterlife,” I
consider the public reception of the Court’s decision, and
then move forward from 1952 to the rise of Jackson’s
concurrence in the 1970s, focusing on its appearance in the
Watergate litigation and in congressional deliberations over
10. This is a widespread judgment. Stephen M. Griffin, The Executive Power,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 343, 348 (Mark Tushnet,
Mark A. Graber & Sanford Levinson eds., 2015) (“Justice Robert Jackson’s
concurrence has won the respect of history and fundamentally restructured the
doctrinal playing field for presidential power . . . .”).
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proposals to regulate presidential power. Brief as it is, this
study will show how the expansive, general, theoretical
character of Jackson’s concurrence made it useful to
congressmen. Broad opinions, like dicta, straying from the
case or controversy before the Court, can invite sharp
criticism for exceeding judicial power. But judicial breadth
has democratic value. It gives folks off the Court a handhold
for taking up an opinion and using it to serve their own ends
and construct fundamental law anew. 11 At the very least, we
ought to weigh this democratic value against the democratic
cost of judicial interference in a dispute between the political
branches. As we will see, in the Steel Seizure Case, Jackson
intentionally addressed the political branches in his
concurrence. He wrote it so they would use it.
I.

“LIFE”

A. The Background
The basic facts of the Steel Seizure Case are well known.
It arose out of a labor dispute between a union, the United
Steelworkers of America, and management at the mills
where its members worked. The union wanted a wage
increase and threatened to strike, disrupting production.
The government was drawn into the case by the
regulatory context. The country was experiencing significant
inflation, and Congress had responded by passing a series of
statutes that gave the President authority to impose price
ceilings. When the United Steelworkers indicated their
intent in late 1951 to negotiate for increased wages, plant
management thought the threat of a strike might give them
leverage to negotiate a price increase. 12 The President,
11. Cf. Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577,
580–81, 644 (1993) (arguing that the Court is not anti-democratic because it is
engaged in an extended “dialogue” with the other branches about constitutional
meaning).
12. See A.H. Raskin, Steel Puts Pay Raise Up to Government, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
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however, had subdelegated his power to an administrative
board, and under its regulations prices were set by a formula
that depended on industry profits. Despite the threat of a
strike, then, there was no guarantee that a price increase
was forthcoming. As it happened, the administrative
agencies working on the dispute, the Office of Price
Stabilization and the Wage Stabilization Board, did propose
a price increase, along with an increase in wages, but the new
price fell short of management demands. Negotiations
stalled, and the union announced its intent to strike on April
4, 1952. 13
These types of labor conflict had arisen before, beginning
with the rise of large labor unions in the early twentieth
century. In fact, during World War II, President Roosevelt
had responded to strikes by seizing plants and sending in
federal troops to ensure that workers did not disrupt
production. In a memorandum from June 1941, just before
he was appointed to the Supreme Court, then-Attorney
General Robert Jackson concluded that a presidential
proclamation seizing an airplane manufacturing plant was
constitutional, resting his analysis on “the aggregate of
Presidential powers derived from the Constitution itself and
from statutes,” and pointing to statutes obligating the
president to raise and equip the armed forces, which he
thought implied a discretion to choose the means. In this
particular case, thought Jackson, efforts by Communists to
undermine labor negotiations and interfere with the
manufacture of warplanes gave the strike the character of an
16, 1951, at 17 (“‘Whether our workers are to get a raise, and how much it will be
if they do,’ Mr. Fairless said, ‘is a matter which probably cannot be determined
by collective bargaining, and will apparently have to be decided finally in
Washington.’”).
13. Patricia L. Bellia, Story of the Steel Seizure Case, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER
STORIES 233, 235 (Christopher H. Schroeder & Curtis A. Bradley eds., 2009). As
Professor Bellia reports, President Truman later accused the management of
steel companies of attempting to “extort a substantial profit, at the expense of
economic stability,” for refusing to accept the steel price proposed by the Office of
Price Stabilization. Id. at 243.
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“insurrection”
against
government,
triggering
the
President’s authority under the Commander-in-Chief
Clause. 14 Several years later, Congress passed the War
Labor Disputes Act, which gave the President statutory
authority to seize plants when a labor dispute could interfere
with war production. 15
In the years following World War II, however, the legal
regime for handling labor disputes shifted in crucial ways.
They became subject to administrative rules and judicial
review—something that was occurring in much of
government. 16 The War Labor Disputes Act was permitted to
expire. In its place, the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 authorized
the President to appoint a board to investigate a dispute and
the Attorney General to apply to a district court for a
temporary injunction stopping a strike. 17 The statute was
notably passed over Truman’s veto. 18 Disputes that resisted
resolution by these means might be handled by passing
special legislation that concerned only a single imminent
strike. 19 In addition, amendments to the Defense Production
Act authorized the President to seek the condemnation of
property needed for national defense by instituting an action

14. Louis Stark, Roosevelt Explains Seizure; Jackson Cites Insurrection, N.Y.
TIMES, June 10, 1941, at 1 (quoting statement by then-Attorney General
Jackson); see also Powers of the President Under the War Labor Disputes Act to
Seize Properties Affected by Strikes, 40 Op. Att’y Gen. 312 (1944), reprinted in
H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE ATTORNEYS GENERAL 330–37
(1999) (similar opinion from AG Biddle and discussion of Jackson’s statement).
Arguably it is Jackson’s memorandum, rather than Justice Vinson’s later
opinion, that is the real source of the “completion power.”
15. War Labor Disputes Act, ch.144, 57 Stat. 163 (1943).
16. The Administrative Procedure Act was passed in 1946. Administrative
Procedure Act, ch.324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 5 U.S.C.).
17. Taft-Hartley Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
18. See Bellia, supra note 13, at 242.
19. 93 CONG. REC. 3836 (1947) (statement of Sen. Taft).
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in an appropriate court. 20
B. The Litigation
President Truman did not use these mechanisms for
dealing with the threat of a strike. Arguably, none of the
statutes was a clear fit. Instead, he issued an executive order
directing the Secretary of Commerce simply to take
possession of the steel mills and operate them. 21
It seems clear that the White House did not anticipate
how unpopular a seizure would be. Blowback was
immediate. 22 The public seemed inclined to regard Truman’s
action as different from Roosevelt’s wartime measures.
There was apparently little sense that steel was scarce or
that a strike would upend the supply chain. 23
Proceedings in the district court fed dislike of the
President’s position. As Professor Patricia Bellia has shown,
the government’s filings focused on the question of
constitutional power, essentially cutting and pasting an
argument from legal briefs previously filed in litigation
challenging President Roosevelt’s seizure of the Montgomery
Ward department store, an act that did not clearly fall under
20. Defense Production Act of 1950, ch. 932, 64 Stat. 798, 799–800 (codified
as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 2061–70); Defense Production Act Amendments of
1951, ch. 275, 65 Stat. 131, 132 (codified in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C., 33
U.S.C., and 40 U.S.C.).
21. Directing the Secretary of Commerce to Take Possession of and Operate
the Plants and Facilities of Certain Steel Companies, Exec. Order No. 10,340, 17
Fed. Reg. 3139, 3139–41 (Apr. 10, 1952).
22. See, for example, the newspaper pieces quoted in Charles C. Hileman et
al., Supreme Court Clerks’ Recollections of October Term 1951, Including the Steel
Seizure Cases, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1239, 1265 (2008) (statement of moderator
John Q. Barrett) (“The response to this action by President Truman was swift
and negative. The Chicago Daily News called it ‘leaping socialism.’ The New York
Daily News said ‘Hitler and Mussolini would have loved this.’ The Washington
Post wrote, ‘President Truman’s seizure of the steel industry will probably go
down in history as one of the most high-handed acts committed by an American
President.’”).
23. MAEVA MARCUS, TRUMAN
PRESIDENTIAL POWER 225 (1977).

AND THE

STEEL SEIZURE CASE: THE LIMITS
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defense production statutes. 24 The district judge in the Steel
Seizure Case, a Roosevelt appointee named David Pine,
seized on the government’s constitutional arguments and,
testing their boundaries, drew the government’s lawyer into
asserting that the President possessed a power to do what
was necessary to meet an emergency. 25 When the colloquy
was reported in the press, it led to widespread condemnation,
and President Truman issued a statement disclaiming the
view. 26 The government’s handling of litigation had shifted
the frame from a disruptive labor dispute to an extreme
doctrine of presidential power. 27
These events also seem to have framed the case for the
Supreme Court. Maeva Marcus, a legal historian whose 1977
book on the Steel Seizure Case remains its most
comprehensive treatment, thought that public opinion must
have influenced the Justices to take the case and resolve it
as they did. 28 Like the public, some of the justices saw not a
dangerous military crisis, but an effort by the President to
govern outside law, a deliberate indifference to Congress,
and a theft of private property. 29 From this perspective, the
salient facts were that Congress had told the administration
how to handle labor strikes, but the President had elected
24. Bellia, supra note 13, at 248.
25. Transcript of Record at 371, Steel Seizure Case, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (Nos.
744, 745), quoted in Bellia, supra note 13, at 249–50.
26. See, e.g., Joseph A. Loftus, Truman Concedes Constitution Puts Limits on
Powers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1952, at 1.
27. On the doctrine of necessity and presidential power, see John C. Dehn,
The Commander-in-Chief and the Necessities of War: A Conceptual Framework,
83 TEMP. L. REV. 599, 656–58 (2011).
28. MARCUS, supra note 23, at 223–25; see also Hileman et al., supra note 22,
at 1268–69 (statement of Chief Justice Rehnquist, former clerk to Justice
Jackson).
29. Justice Clark had written a memorandum as Attorney General defending
the President’s “inherent” powers to act in an emergency; it seems clear from
Clark’s opinion in Steel Seizure that he did not think such an emergency existed.
Steel Seizure Case, 343 U.S. at 662 (Clark, J., concurring); Hearings Before the
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare on S.249, pt. 1, 81st Cong. 232 (1949);
MARCUS, supra note 23, at 209.
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not to follow those procedures. If the Court was to insert
itself into this sort of conflict, what it would need was a legal
framework that articulated the nature of the relationship
between the President and the Congress. Of course, today we
have such a framework: the doctrine of “separation of
powers.” At the time, however, only fragments of such a
doctrine existed.
C. The State of the Doctrine
Here’s what there was. First, there was a body of
theoretical political writing on the differences between
legislatures, executives, and courts. 30 Some of this writing
was quite old—think John Locke and the Baron de
Montesquieu in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
Though their theories had cachet (they still do), a theory is
not a doctrine: it’s not formulated to provide judges with a
basis to resolve a litigated case.
Modern political scientists were also at work on the
presidency, attempting to theorize the powers presidents
were thought to enjoy over foreign policy and armed conflict.
A leading voice in the area was Edward Corwin, professor at
Princeton, whose book, The President: Office & Powers, was
in its third edition by the time of the Steel Seizure Case.
Corwin drew on Locke’s writings to argue that the grant of
executive power to the President conveyed a broad discretion
to handle crises in foreign affairs. 31 The account fit the needs
of the Cold War well. To keep the peace and control the
spread of communism, the President would need a power to
dispatch and station the armed forces around the globe. 32

30. See M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 64–
73, 89–93 (1967).
31. EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787–1948, at
6–7 (3d ed. 1948). Another leading scholarly treatment of these issues can be
found in the work of Clinton Rossiter. See CLINTON L. ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL
DICTATORSHIP: CRISIS GOVERNMENT IN THE MODERN DEMOCRACIES 13 (1948).
32. STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, LONG WARS AND THE CONSTITUTION 4 (2013).
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Beyond theory, however, there were only a handful of
narrow judicial rules for resolving conflicts between the
branches. 33 The law was probably most developed in the
context of war and foreign policy. Though there were
precedents here, they did not add up to a clear doctrine.
Cases from the early nineteenth century tended to confirm
the supremacy of Congress in matters like the scope of armed
conflict, 34 identification of public enemies, 35 and the
application of international law. 36 In one of these cases, Little
v. Barreme, Chief Justice John Marshall invalidated the
seizure of a ship that had been made under a presidential
commission on grounds the commission exceeded the scope
authorized by statute. 37
But later cases cut a different figure. In the final decades
of the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court began to yield
the President greater latitude and flexibility in conducting
foreign affairs. 38 By 1936, with considerable instability in
Europe, Asia, and South America, Justices on the Supreme
Court were prepared to concede the President complete
discretion in setting the nation’s foreign policy. In United
States v. Curtiss-Wright, the Court rejected an industry
challenge to a statute that delegated authority to the
president to prohibit the sale of arms to certain foreign

33. See, for example, WILLIAM BONDY, THE SEPARATION OF GOVERNMENTAL
POWERS IN HISTORY, IN THEORY, AND IN THE CONSTITUTIONS v–vi (AMS Press, Inc.
1967) (1896), particularly the structure of Part III, which describes constitutional
doctrine. Bondy’s book is essentially a treatise, and its small size and scope in
comparison to coeval treatises on due process and police power shows the limits
of the separation-of-powers doctrine at the time. See generally, e.g., ERNST
FREUND, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (1904);
RODNEY L. MOTT, DUE PROCESS OF LAW (Da Capo Press 1973) (1926).
34. See Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 179 (1804).
35. See Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 39, 42, 44–45, 45 (1800) (concluding
that France was a public enemy only if Congress had enacted a law making it so);
Dehn, supra note 27, at 616–17 (describing the case).
36. See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
37. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 177–78.
38. G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 35–43 (2000).
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nations at war. Justice Sutherland set out a general account
of the power of the federal government over foreign affairs,
which he thought did not derive from the Constitution at all
but was “inherent” in sovereign government. “The powers to
declare and wage war, to conclude peace, to make treaties, to
maintain diplomatic relations with other sovereignties,” he
wrote, “would have vested in the federal government as
necessary concomitants of nationality,” even if they had not
been mentioned. 39 These powers were for the President to
control. Seizing on language from a speech John Marshall
had made while a member of the House of Representatives,
Sutherland described the President as the “sole organ of the
nation in its external relations.” 40
Domestic law was considerably less developed. We had
strands of cases and ideas, each stitched to a sphere of policy
and a legal context. Frank Strong’s popular constitutional
law text from 1950 didn’t even have a chapter on “separation
of powers.” 41 His book did describe something called “merger
of governmental function.” The first doctrine listed there was
non-delegation doctrine (or, in his terminology, the problem
of “delegational merger”). At the time the doctrine had been
recently applied. Several decisions in the 1930s had struck
down major pieces of New Deal legislation on non-delegation
grounds. 42 As the Court constructed it, the doctrine
39. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936).
40. Id. at 319–20 (quoting 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613 (1800) (statement of thenRep. John Marshall)). Scholars have long pointed out that Sutherland took the
expression “sole organ” out of context, changing its meaning. E.g., Louis Fisher,
The Staying Power of Erroneous Dicta: From Curtiss-Wright to Zivotofsky, 31
CONST. COMMENT. 149, 150 (2016). The Supreme Court finally rejected the “sole
organ” doctrine of presidential control over foreign affairs in Zivotofsky v. Kerry,
135 S. Ct. 2076, 2089–90 (2015).
41. See FRANK R. STRONG, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ix–xii (1950).
42. See, e.g., J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409
(1928). The Court struck down domestic legislation on non-delegation grounds in
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 430 (1935), and ALA Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 539–42 (1935). Curtiss-Wright also
involved a non-delegation challenge, but there the Court sustained the law on
grounds that it concerned foreign policy. See Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S.
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prohibited Congress from vesting executive agencies with
legislative power, and required an “intelligible principle” for
action, which agencies would fill in with details. These cases
were some of the first in which the phrase “separation of
powers” appeared in the text of a Supreme Court opinion. 43
A doctrine of presidential removal power existed but was
also quite new. In the case of Myers v. United States, only
about twenty-five years old in 1952, the Court had held that
Congress could not restrict the president’s power to fire
executive officers at will. 44 Chief Justice Taft based the
holding on the Vesting Clause and Take Care Clause of
Article II, arguing that if the President could not remove
subordinates who had failed to do their job, he could not
ensure that the law was “faithfully executed.” 45 Within a
decade this basis was exploited to narrow the doctrine; job
at 306.
43. For the first appearance of the expression, see Panama Refin. Co., 293
U.S. at 440 (Cardozo, J., dissenting). Variants can be discovered in case reports
much earlier, sometimes from the arguments of counsel or from language taken
from lower-court opinions; but it is only in the early twentieth century that usage
conveys a clear sense that the phrase stands for a judicial doctrine. See, e.g.,
Brush v. Ware, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 93, 99 (1841) (“The executive of the United
States, in issuing patents for land, is required to perform, and does perform
certain acts of a judicial nature. And when an executive officer acts judicially, as
he often must, (for the idea of a perfect separation of the powers of government,
is a mere abstraction, and wholly unattainable in practice,) his decisions are as
valid, and have the same effect as judgments pronounced by courts of justice; and
are, ordinarily, far more difficult to revise, if erroneous, than the latter.”
(argument of counsel)); Shoemaker v. United States, 13 S. Ct. 631, 371 (1893)
(“‘Justice Story, in pointing out the true meaning of the principle of the separation
of the powers of the government, (which is not declared in the federal constitution
in direct words, as in most of the state constitutions, but is enjoined, practically,
by assignment of the different powers to the three departments,) . . . .’” (quoting
United States v. Cooper, 20 D.C. (9 Mackey) 104, 123–24 (1891)); McGrain v.
Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 170 (1927) (“[I]t is not within the range of this power,
but must be left to the courts, conformably to the constitutional separation of
governmental powers . . . .”).
44. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926).
45. Id. at 117; see U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 1, 3. For connections between the
Myers decision and the myth of the “Lost Cause,” a reactionary revision of the
meaning and significance of the Civil War, see Bowie & Renan, supra note 2, at
2056–82.
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protections for officers engaged in administrative
adjudication or rulemaking were upheld on grounds that
these activities differed from execution of the law. 46
If the eye could track a uniform movement across the
various lines of cases, it was in the direction of the President.
Seizures and condemnations of property evince this
development, though precedents were a mix of cases
involving foreign war, civil war, insurrection, and domestic
policy. Early rules limiting seizures to congressional
authorization gave way during the Civil War, when
President Lincoln acted on his own initiative (though his
conduct was later ratified by Congress), which the Court
approved. 47 After the war, the Court also gave its support to
direct presidential actions to protect the personnel and
instrumentalities of the government, which at least once
involved seizure without statutory authorization. 48 More
relevant, in the 1915 case of United States v. Midwest Oil Co.,
the Court reasoned that Congress should be understood to
have consented to a long-standing executive practice (in this
case, of setting aside lands opened for development), even
where the practice was inconsistent with the text of a federal
statute. 49 But to say these cases amounted to a general
doctrine of presidential power to seize private property when
‘necessary’ would be too much. There is little evidence,

46. See, e.g., Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 627–28 (1935).
Humphrey’s Executor was another of the earliest Supreme Court opinions to
include the phrase “separation of powers.” See id. at 629–30 (“separation of the
powers of these departments”).
47. For an early holding on wartime seizures that emphasizes congressional
authorization, see Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 125–29 (1814).
On the president’s power to order a blockade though no war had been declared,
pursuant to which vessels might be seized, see The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black)
635, 670 (1862). President Lincoln ordered the seizure of a variety of property
during the war. See DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN’S CONSTITUTION 115–44 (2003)
(reviewing Lincoln’s seizures during the war).
48. In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 75–76 (1890) (personnel); In re Debs, 158 U.S.
564, 599–600 (1895) (interstate railroads).
49. 236 U.S. 459, 474 (1915).
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outside government briefs, of such an understanding. 50
Notably, as we’ve already discussed, Congress authorized
most of the President’s domestic industrial seizures during
World War II.
Aside from a few other doctrines not relevant in the case
(relating to things like pardons, congressional investigations,
and judicial independence), that’s what there was of
“separation of powers” in the Supreme Court. Sensibly, then,
several justices in the Steel Seizure Case framed their
opinions as efforts to articulate a general judicial doctrine on
the subject. As we will see, they made use of the materials
they had at hand, including non-delegation doctrine. That
they were attempting to do this at one fell swoop, in a highprofile, high-stakes case, is likely why we have seven
different opinions. Justice Jackson began drafting his own
opinion before oral argument—as was sometimes his
custom—but even before receiving the briefs; his papers
included drafts from May 7 and 8, while the government did
not file its brief until May 8. 51 One suspects that Jackson saw
the occasion for an opinion that would transcend the confines
of the parties and their case.
D. The Opinions
Though there are seven opinions in the case,
commentators have long focused on four and sorted them
into two groups: first, the opinions of Hugo Black and
William Douglas; and second, the opinions of Felix
Frankfurter and Robert Jackson. The sorting indeed reflects
a basic divergence in approach to the task of constructing a
general doctrine of separation of powers. At the same time,
however, it tends to suppress an important difference
between the opinions of Justices Frankfurter and Jackson.
50. For the perspective on these seizures in the government’s Steel Seizure
Case brief, see MARCUS, supra note 23, at 156–57.
51. Id. at 149; Adam J. White, Justice Jackson’s Draft Opinions in The Steel
Seizure Cases, 69 ALB. L. REV. 1107, 1109–10 (2006).
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Jackson’s opinion was more general and more theoretical,
and this is crucial to explaining why it has enjoyed a more
robust afterlife than Frankfurter’s despite their similarities.
Indeed, it was where Frankfurter was uncharacteristically
general that his opinion has proved most useful to later
generations: the idea that history could place a “gloss” on the
meaning of executive power.
1. Formalists
The account of the Constitution’s separation of powers
given by Justices Black and Douglas is often described as
“formalist.” The justices distinguished legislative from
executive power by defining the terms, drawing on ideas
from political theory and the Court’s non-delegation
precedents. Thus, according to Justice Black, Truman’s
seizure order could not “be sustained because of the several
constitutional provisions that grant executive power to the
President,” since those grants “refute[] the idea that he is to
be a lawmaker.” 52 In other words, to have executive power
was to be denied lawmaking power. What, then, was
lawmaking power? In this context, it entailed settling on a
policy for resolving domestic labor disputes of national
significance. The President’s seizure order had clearly
exercised that power. “The President’s order does not direct
that a congressional policy be executed in a manner
prescribed by Congress—it directs that a presidential policy
be executed in a manner prescribed by the President.” 53 In
this way, Truman had usurped power granted to Congress.
Justice Douglas’s opinion sounded in a similar register. 54
One can think of the Justices’ solution as incorporating
52. Steel Seizure Case, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952).
53. Id. at 588.
54. Article I of the Constitution, Justice Douglas observed, vested all
legislative power in Congress. “The legislative nature of the action taken by the
President seems to me to be clear,” since it required compensation for the
confiscated property, and only Congress could pay it. Id. at 630–31 (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
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a “negative” or a “dormant” version of non-delegation
doctrine. Non-delegation doctrine prohibited delegations of
open-ended, policy-making discretion to the president, on
grounds that they licensed his exercise of the legislative
power given by the Constitution to Congress. Though there
had been no delegation here, the Article I Vesting Clause by
itself prohibited the president from exercising such a power.
2. Functionalists
The second group comprises Justices Frankfurter and
Jackson. They based their account of the Constitution’s
separation of powers on a different source. Before
Frankfurter was appointed to the Supreme Court in 1939,
early in his career, he had taught classes on administrative
law at Harvard Law School. A series of lectures were
collected in a volume titled The Public and Its Government,
published in 1930. 55 In those lectures, Frankfurter rejected
the account of legislative and executive power extracted from
political theory. The need to keep these powers distinct was
simply “a principle of statesmanship,” which “the practical
demands of government” made impossible to follow. It was “a
political maxim and not a technical rule of law.” 56
A judicial doctrine of the separation of powers had to be
built on something else. As Frankfurter put it in his
concurring opinion in Steel Seizure, “the content of the three
authorities of government is not to be derived from an
abstract analysis.” 57 They couldn’t be, because “[t]he areas
are partly interacting, not wholly disjointed.” 58 The
formalists would have the legislature settle new policies in
response to the changing needs of society, and leave to the
executive the task of simply carrying them out, filling in the
55. FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC AND ITS GOVERNMENT (1930).
56. Id. at 77; see also James Willard Hurst, Themes in United States Legal
History, in FELIX FRANKFURTER: A TRIBUTE 199, 206–11 (Wallace Mendelson ed.,
1964).
57. Steel Seizure Case, 343 U.S. at 610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
58. Id.
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details as necessary. 59 But it was a euphemism to speak of
the executive as “‘filling in the details’ of a policy set forth in
statutes,” since, Frankfurter observed, “the ‘details’ are of
the essence; they give meaning and content to vague
contours.” 60 Effective regulation of modern society required
this overlap in legislative and executive policymaking. One
only had to look to the actual operation of government for
evidence. As Frankfurter put it in his Steel Seizure
concurrence, “the way the framework has consistently
operated fairly establishes that it has operated according to
its true nature.” 61
In this case, however, history had not placed a “gloss” on
executive power sufficient to sustain the president’s seizure.
There was no long-standing practice of presidential seizures
in times of peace or outside a battlefield. And Congress had
rejected such a policy by deliberately selecting a different
mechanism for resolving labor disputes and passing it into
law over the President’s veto. To allow the President to
simply ignore this mechanism would disrupt the “system of
checks and balances” in the Constitution. 62 It was balance,
then, not formal separation, that a doctrine of separation of
powers required.
Justice Jackson also began from the premise that a
judicial doctrine of separation of powers must reflect how
government actually worked. This ruled out the formalism of
Justice Black. “The actual art of governing under our
Constitution,” Jackson wrote, “does not and cannot conform
to judicial definitions of the power of any of its branches
based on isolated clauses or even single Articles torn from
context.” Such an approach would be inconsistent with
Constitution’s aim to “integrate the dispersed powers into a
59. FRANKFURTER, supra note 55, at 10, 72.
60. Felix Frankfurter, The Task of Administrative Law, 75 U. PA. L. REV. 614,
614–15 (1927).
61. Steel Seizure Case, 343 U.S. at 610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
62. See id. at 593.
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workable government.” 63
3. Justice Jackson’s Contribution
Jackson’s most long-lasting contributions, however,
departed from Frankfurter. Where Justice Frankfurter
expressed an unwillingness to sketch a general account of
how the branches should work together, Jackson thought
attempting such a thing was essential for giving guidance to
the executive branch.
The key idea Jackson settled on was the sequence of
governmental action. 64 Jackson’s papers show that his
scheme built on remarks made in an opinion by district judge
Augustus Hand, but they went far beyond them, formalizing
and generalizing Hand’s intuitions. 65 As Jackson explained
it, if Congress acted first and authorized what the President
later did, then the President’s act in effect rested on the two
branches’ combined constitutional authority, and the Court
should nearly always defer. If Congress did not act, in
contrast, it might invite the President to take the initiative,
but he would need to rely on a power the Constitution
committed to him. Since its distribution of power was
sometimes uncertain, this would require the Court to
consider both the text and the context. Lastly, if Congress
acted first and prohibited what the President later did, then
an exclusive constitutional basis for the President’s action
would need to be clear. Jackson didn’t tell us whether there
was any such power—only that the President’s authority, in
such a case, “is at its lowest ebb,” and that the Court must
scrutinize his conduct with care. 66
Unlike Frankfurter, Jackson also took up the claim that
63. Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
64. H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE PRESIDENT AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF: AN ESSAY
CONSTITUTIONAL VISION 51 & n.50 (2014) (quoting Philip Bobbit, War Powers:
An Essay on John Hart Ely’s War and Responsibility: Constitutional Lessons of
Vietnam and Its Aftermath, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1364, 1388 (1994)).

IN

65. White, supra note 51, at 1109–10.
66. Steel Seizure Case, 343 U.S. at 637–38 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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the President enjoyed an “inherent power” to meet
emergencies. He arguably had to, given that lawyers for the
government had cited advice Jackson had given, while
Attorney General, to the President on the subject. 67 In oral
argument the Solicitor General had pressed the case for such
a power as concomitant to the President’s office and the
sovereignty of the national government. But, thought Justice
Jackson, the construction was “nebulous,” and the text of the
Constitution expressly provided for emergencies by vesting
certain powers in Congress. There was good reason for this
arrangement; not only would it encourage emergencies by
vesting a power to declare them in the same hands that
exercised the power—the President—but the arrangement
would threaten the rule of law itself.
Jackson perceived a deep connection between the
sequence of governmental action and the rule of law. He
described this idea using the expression “free government.”
Free government was government under law. Its essence
was, he wrote, quoting a poem by the English writer Rudyard
Kipling, “leave to live by no man’s leave, underneath the
law.” 68 Legal historian Gerard Magliocca has noted that
Jackson quoted the language in an argument at the
Nuremberg trials as well. 69 Much of the Kipling poem, titled
“The Old Issue,” is fanciful history. But in substance it
recounts England’s very real experience with curbing abuses
of royal power. The language was apt, thought Jackson,
because Truman was attempting to seize the steel mills by
“individual will.” Since Congress had acted first, denying the
President this power, his conduct became “an exercise of

67. See id. at 645 & n.14 (citing Jackson’s opinion as Attorney General,
Acquisition of Naval and Air Bases in Exch. for Over-Age Destroyers, 39 Op. Att’y
Gen. 484 (1940)).
68. Id. at 654–55.
69. Gerard Magliocca, Rudyard Kipling’s “The Old Issue,” PRAWFSBLAWG,
(May 2, 2021), https://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2021/05/rudyardkiplings-the-old-issue.html.
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authority without law.” 70 For the Supreme Court to validate
the seizure would mean giving up on free government. It fell
to the Court, more than to any other institution, to insist that
“the Executive be under the law, and that law be made by
parliamentary deliberations.” 71
This trend in Jackson’s thinking was already evident in
cases decided after his return from Nuremberg. Agencies of
the executive branch were coming under statutory and
judicial control. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA),
passed in 1946, created a set of procedures for adjudication
and rulemaking within the executive branch and provided
for judicial review. In a decision from 1950 that applied the
APA to deportation proceedings, Wong Yang Sung v.
McGrath, Justice Jackson explained that the aim of the
statute was to ensure regularity, rule of law, and shared
governance in administrative proceedings—governance by
settled procedures involving more than one person. In these
respects, the APA brought the Constitution’s Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause to bear on the operations of
government. 72 It was not yet known whether the APA bound
the President himself, in contrast to executive agencies
under his supervision. But in Steel Seizure Jackson
suggested the Constitution did, even in emergencies, and
that the Court had a special role to play in ensuring
government proceeded under law rather than by individual
whim. 73

70. Steel Seizure Case, 343 U.S. at 655 (Jackson, J., concurring).
71. Id.
72. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 41 (1950).
73. A later Court declined to apply the APA to the President on grounds that
the text did not clearly support it. See Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788,
796 (1992). But see generally Kathryn E. Kovacs, Constraining the Statutory
President, 98 WASH. U. L. REV. 63 (2020) (arguing that Franklin was wrongly
decided); Shalev Roisman, Presidential Law, 105 MINN. L. REV. 1269, 1271 (2021)
(arguing that the Constitution imposes a duty to deliberate on the President
before the exercise of statutory powers).
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II. “AFTERLIFE”
A. Immediate Reaction to the Steel Seizure Case
The Supreme Court’s order invalidating the seizure was
widely celebrated. Nearly every major newspaper celebrated
the Court’s decision to curb a now broadly-unpopular
President Truman. In an op-ed written just five days after
the opinions were released, the journalist Arthur Krock
surmised that “[t]he decision was one of the most popular
ever rendered by the court because in substance it could be
explained to the people as a holding that ‘no man, including
the President, is above the law’ and that private property
rights are still sacred in the United States.” 74 Krock read the
decision to “impose the first specific restraint in the annals
of the Supreme Court, on a Presidential act based on a claim
that a national emergency and legislation . . . required it.” 75
Congress celebrated, too. Representatives seem to have
grasped what moved Justice Jackson. Senator Harry Cain
thought the Court’s decision stood for the principle that “our
Constitution is not to be employed to serve the purposes and
whims of individual men.” 76
There were some criticisms of the Supreme Court’s work.
A German newspaper op-ed I stumbled upon while
researching this Essay, which a prior owner folded into my
used copy of John Frank’s constitutional law casebook,
faulted Chief Justice Vinson for not preventing the
proliferation of individual opinions. 77 Vinson, the author
thought, had abandoned his former role (honed during his
time in the Congress and administration) as a master of

74. Arthur Krock, Powers of a President After the Steel Case, N.Y. TIMES, June
8, 1952, at E3. Professor Marcus thought the Krock piece “typified newspaper
reaction.” MARCUS, supra note 23, at 212.
75. Krock, supra note 74, at E3.
76. 98 CONG. REC. 6289 (1952).
77. Chief Justice und acht andere Greise, DEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, Sept. 19, 1953.
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compromise, instead giving in to a temptation to publicize his
own unsupported intuitions about presidential power. 78
Professor Paul Freund’s Foreword in the Harvard Law
Review also complained about the many concurring opinions,
and some legal scholars observed that it was difficult to
identify the Court’s holding, given the material differences
between the views of the six Justices who had signed Black’s
opinion for the Court. 79 Other voices criticized the Court for
activism. Judge Learned Hand, sitting on the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, opined in a private letter to
his friend Frankfurter that “[s]uch jobs are not for judges”—
that is, enjoining a presidential seizure on separation of
powers grounds. 80
Jackson, of course, had gone considerably beyond
Frankfurter in sketching out a general account of the
relationship between the President and Congress. But few
voices singled out the Jackson opinion for criticism or for
praise. His was one of seven opinions, and if was known for
anything, it was for adopting a more functional, realistic
approach to the separation of powers, along with Justice
Frankfurter.
B. “Taking Up” the Justices’ Opinions
So, when did this change, and why? By all indications
the Steel Seizure Case remains popular. But our
contemporary interpretation of the rule coming out of the
case is quite different from what it was in June 1952.
Lawyers have come to identify the case with Jackson’s
concurrence—and in particular, with the broadest part of his
concurrence, the three categories of presidential power. Steel
78. Id.
79. Paul Freund, Supreme Court, 1951 Term: The Year of the Steel Case, 66
HARV. L. REV. 89, 103–04 (1952); MARCUS, supra note 23, at 215 (reporting that
the Court was “taken to task for the multiplicity of its opinions”).
80. Letter from Learned Hand to Felix Frankfurter (June 13, 1952), quoted in
MARCUS, supra note 23, at 222.

900

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

Seizure Case has come to be identified in the lawyerly mind
with a theoretical concurrence that earned a single vote.
The first changes can be detected in the 1960s, when the
formalism endorsed by Justices Black and Douglas began to
retreat in the face of increasing presidential powers to
determine foreign policy. In the 1965 case Zemel v. Rusk, the
Court held that the Secretary of State could refuse to
validate the passports of American citizens for travel to
Cuba. 81 The relevant statute, the Passport Act of 1926,
authorized the Secretary of State to “grant and issue
passports . . . under such rules as the President shall
designate,” a completely open-ended delegation. Exercising
this power, the President had issued an order authorizing
the Secretary to refuse to issue passports for travel to
“certain countries.” Justice Black now found himself in
dissent. The “regulation of passports,” he wrote, “just like
regulation of steel companies, is a lawmaking, not an
executive, law-enforcing, function.” 82 Such a power was
vested in Congress and could not be delegated to the
President.
Black’s formalist account of executive power was hard to
square with governmental practice in the issuance of
passports. Since Black would not permit Congress to
delegate open-ended discretion to the President, any
authority he enjoyed would have to derive from an
independent grant of power in Article II, or perhaps an
“inherent” power to conduct foreign affairs. This was of
course how an earlier Supreme Court had framed matters in
the Curtiss-Wright case. Later Supreme Courts were more
cautious. One way they dealt with this difficulty was by
developing a “political question doctrine,” a line of precedent
that counseled judicial inaction when a decision was
committed by the Constitution to the political branches or

81. 381 U.S. 1, 10–13 (1965).
82. Id. at 20–21 (Black, J., dissenting).
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was in some way unamenable to judicial resolution. 83 In this
way, at least, the Court avoided giving its blessing to a
discretionary or inherent power. Of course, it also prevented
the Court from intervening at all.
C. President Nixon and Watergate
It was President Nixon whose foreign policy strategy
pressed this dilemma to its limit. After his election in 1970,
he expanded the military operation authorized by Congress
in 1964 in the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution by ordering bombing
in Cambodia. In response to uneasiness in Congress about
these operations, and a suggestion that Congress might try
to stop them by restricting funding, presidential lawyers
pressed the case that the President had an unregulated
inherent power to conduct the foreign affairs of the country,
including by using armed force, and that Congress lacked
any power to interfere. 84 When the War Powers Resolution
was passed over Nixon’s veto in 1973, legislators cited
Justice Jackson’s interpretation of the Commander-in-Chief
Clause in the Steel Seizure Case. 85
But it was with the 1974 litigation over executive
privilege in the Watergate criminal conspiracy case that
Jackson’s opinion really emerged as the leading construction
of the President’s relation to Congress. We have long known
that Jackson’s concurrence figured in the Supreme Court’s
opinion sustaining the Special Prosecutor’s subpoena of the
Watergate tapes, in United States v. Nixon. Chief Justice
Burger quoted Jackson’s concurrence as he addressed the
government’s argument that the President’s immunity from

83. In a concurring opinion in Baker v. Carr, however, Justice Douglas
suggested that Youngstown showed that courts could involve themselves in
matters that had a strong political cast. 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
84. DAVID J. BARRON, WAGING WAR: THE CLASH BETWEEN PRESIDENTS AND
CONGRESS, 1776 TO ISIS 317–21 (2016) (describing a memo by Tom Huston,
“Assault on the Constitutional Power of the Presidency”).
85. See, e.g., 119 CONG. REC. 33,563 (1973) (statement of Sen. Dole).
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a judicial subpoena must be unqualified and absolute. 86 If
any interference by one branch with another was a violation
of the Constitution’s separation of powers, a judicial
subpoena into the White House would be intolerable. What
Jackson’s opinion gave the Court was another way to
conceive of the demands of separation of powers. The
Constitution “contemplates that practice will integrate the
dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins
upon its branches separateness but interdependence,
autonomy but reciprocity.” 87
It seems to have been the initial Watergate Special
Prosecutor, Archibald Cox, who was responsible for
introducing Jackson’s concurrence into the Watergate
litigation. Cox of course had convened a grand jury in 1973
to investigate allegations by one of the Watergate burglars
that the operation had been planned by high-ranking
governmental officers. When it became known that the
White House had taped meetings in the Oval Office, the
grand jury requested their production. From the beginning,
Nixon’s team invoked a strong conception of separation of
powers to justify their refusal to comply. The President’s
brief declared that if the district court held he was obligated
to disclose the contents of private conversations, “the total
structure of government—dependent as it is upon a
separation of powers—will be impaired.” 88 Cox naturally
took a different view. He conducted extensive research into
the history of presidential assertions of privilege against
demands for the production of evidence. 89 He must have been

86. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705–07 (1974).
87. Id. at 707 (quoting Steel Seizure Case, 343 U.S. 579, 645 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring)).
88. Brief in Opposition at 2, In re Subpoena to Nixon, 360 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C.
1973), quoted in MARCUS, supra note 23, at 241.
89. This research appears to have become part of a law review article
published around the same time. Archibald Cox, Executive Privilege, 122 U. PA.
L. REV. 1383, 1388 n.13 (1974). My father, James R. Steilen, was a research
assistant for Professor Cox at Harvard Law School in the summer of 1972.
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searching for a way to capture the lesson of this history and
seems to have hit on Jackson’s concurrence as a pithy
summary. As District Court Chief Judge Sirica wrote in his
opinion ordering the production of the tapes, “The Special
Prosecutor has correctly noted that the Framers’ intention to
lodge the powers of government in separate bodies also
included interaction between departments. A ‘watertight’
division of different functions was never their design.” He
then quoted Justice Jackson’s language from the
concurrence. 90
Of course, Frankfurter’s Steel Seizure concurrence might
also have been used on the question of the power of a court
to subpoena presidential records, since Frankfurter, too, had
denied that the branches could be formally separated.
Indeed, in some ways Jackson was an inferior source, since
he might also be cited by President Nixon’s lawyers, as
Jackson had authored an opinion as Attorney General
asserting the President’s right to withhold materials
containing confidential communications. 91 So why was
Jackson’s concurrence used? It is difficult to say, but Gerard
Magliocca, a legal historian at Indiana University now
working on a new book about the Steel Seizure Case, has
suggested it was simply “because his opinion was more
quotable.” 92
Around the same time, Jackson’s concurrence began to
appear in other places as well. Nixon’s post-presidency effort
to preserve control over tapes of his presidential
conversations led Congress to enact the Presidential
Recordings and Materials Preservation Act, which the
Supreme Court sustained in an opinion citing both Jackson’s
concurrence and its decision in United States v. Nixon. 93 As
90. In re Subpoena to Nixon, 360 F. Supp. at 8–9.
91. See Cox, supra note 89, at 1400 n.62.
92. Telephone Conversation with Gerard Magliocca, Professor, Ind. Univ.
Robert H. McKinney Sch. of L. (Jan. 21, 2022).
93. Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 442–43 (1977).
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Magliocca has pointed out, legislators were finding other
parts of the concurrence useful. I have already noted its
citation in legislative proceedings on the War Powers
Resolution, which regulated presidential initiations of armed
conflict. There was also the National Emergencies Act, which
regulated presidential declarations of national emergency. 94
The legislative history of the act is replete with references to
Jackson’s concurrence, some in language that suggests it
already enjoyed a sterling reputation. Senator Frank
Church, a Democrat from Idaho, remarked that “Justice
Jackson’s widely quoted and praised concurring opinion
stressed that our system of government is a ‘balanced power
structure’ and pointed out that Executive power to act is a
variable depending upon the collective will of Congress for
its authority.” 95 Legislators were making the opinion their
own; the phrase “balanced power structure” occurs nowhere
in Steel Seizure, and may have been Senator Church’s own
invention.
Law professors also began to feature the concurrence in
their casebooks, incorporating it into their evolving theories
of the law. Gerry Gunther’s influential casebook, in its ninth
edition by 1975 and for many years after probably the
leading constitutional law casebook in the country, placed
the Steel Seizure Case at the beginning of a lengthy chapter
94. Pub. L. No. 94-412, 90 Stat. 1255 (1976).
95. 124 CONG. REC. 29,376 (1978) (statement of Sen. Church). For other
references to Jackson, see generally Legislative History of the Act of September
14, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-412, H.R. 3884, 94th Cong., 90 Stat. 1255 (Westlaw) (last
visited Apr. 28, 2022), and see specifically, for example, 121 CONG. REC. 27,635
(1975) (statement of Rep. Mazzoli); National Emergencies Act: Hearings on H.R.
3384 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. L. & Governmental Rels. of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 23–24, 34 (1975) (statements of Sens. Mathias and
Church); National Emergencies Act: Hearings on H.R. 3384 Before the S. Comm.
on Gov’t Operations, 94th Cong. 6–7 (1975) (statements of Sens. Mathias and
Church); 120 CONG. REC. 34,013–14 (1974) (statement of Sen. Mathias); S. REP.
NO. 93-1193, at 4–7 (1974); 120 CONG. REC. 29,977–78, 29,980, 29,982 (1974)
(statements of Sens. Church and Mathias, and interim report by the Special
Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers in
Support of a Recommended National Emergencies Act); S. REP. NO. 93-549, at 12–
13 (1973).
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titled “Separation of Powers,” in a subsection on “domestic
affairs,” and excerpted more of Jackson’s concurrence than
any other opinion in the case. 96 To be sure, not every scholar
followed suit. Professor Marcus’s book on the Steel Seizure
Case, published in 1977, does not feature Jackson’s
concurrence over the other opinions in the case. 97 Professor
Larry Tribe’s influential casebook likewise did not center
it. 98
D. The Concurrence in the Court, the Congress,
and the Executive
By the early 80s, defenders of a strong executive branch
had begun to pay closer attention to the Jackson
concurrence, too. One encounters scholarly criticisms that
Jackson’s concurrence was an expression of “congressional
primacy in foreign affairs.” 99 Then-Justice William
Rehnquist showed that this was not the case by invoking the
concurrence in his opinion for the Court in Dames & Moore
v. Regan, sustaining an exercise of a presidential power to
nullify judicial attachments of the property of foreign
nationals and dismiss pending litigation. 100 President Carter
took these steps in an effort to resolve the hostage crisis at
the U.S. embassy in Iran. Critics accused Rehnquist of
changing or even abandoning the logic of the concurrence,
but a majority of the Supreme Court had never endorsed the
concurrence, which remained the opinion of a single Justice

96. GERALD GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 401–14
(9th ed. 1975).
97. See MARCUS, supra note 23, at 228–48 (assessing the significance of the
case). Even as late as 1986, an academic commentary on the separation of powers
might treat the opinions on par. See, e.g., ALAN I. BIGEL, THE SUPREME COURT ON
EMERGENCY POWERS, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AND PROTECTION OF CIVIL LIBERTIES 1935–
1975, at 135–50 (1986).
98. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 181–84 (1978).
99. See Bellia, supra note 13, at 271.
100. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 660 (1981).
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in a case where the Court had authored an opinion. 101
Rehnquist himself had been a Jackson law clerk in 1952
when the Steel Seizure Case was decided. What he
accomplished in Dames & Moore was to make the
concurrence the law of the Court and to show how it might
be used in support of presidential powers over foreign policy.
Later decisions of the Court have largely followed suit. 102
Formalist doctrines of separation of powers continued to
prove unworkable and face abandonment. In INS v. Chadha,
Chief Justice Burger wrote for the Court in holding that the
legislative veto provision in the Immigration and Nationality
Act was unconstitutional, on grounds that it reserved to each
house of Congress a power to reverse decisions by the
Attorney General by passing a resolution. The resolution, he
reasoned, was “legislative in its character and effect” since it
altered “the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons”
outside Congress. 103 All such “legislative” acts had to go
through both houses and be signed by the President.
Although it remains good law, Chadha has never really been
followed. Congress and the President continue to honor such
“legislative vetoes” and add hundreds of them to new
statutes. Chadha had little afterlife, because it discarded a
tool too useful to the political branches, and which has not
proved to pose an unmanageable threat of unbalancing
them. 104
These same forces can be seen at work several years after
Chadha in Morrison v. Olson, where the Court addressed one
of the most important questions of separation of powers: the
scope of Congress’s authority to limit the President’s power
to fire an officer in the executive branch. Where did
101. See, e.g., Lee R. Marks & John C. Grabow, The President’s Foreign
Economic Powers after Dames & Moore v. Regan: Legislation by Acquiescence, 68
CORNELL L. REV. 68, 91 & n.156 (1982).
102. See, e.g., Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2083–84 (2015).
103. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952 (1983).
104. Louis Fisher, The Legislative Veto: Invalidated, It Survives, 56 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 273, 286–91 (1993).
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Rehnquist reach to answer this question? Not to the removal
cases, still dominated by the Myers precedent, but to United
States v. Nixon and the Steel Seizure Case, even though
neither expressly addressed the issue. 105 What the cases
captured was the particular shape of linkage between the
Congress and the President, and thus the propriety of a
power in Congress to limit presidential removals. Therefore,
it was Jackson’s (and Frankfurter’s) functional conception of
separation of powers that received the Court’s imprimatur,
rather than formalist doctrines, even where they privileged
legislative power (as Justice Black and Douglas had, basing
their doctrine on non-delegation).
Executive-branch
lawyers
embraced
Jackson’s
concurrence as well, folding it into memoranda on the scope
of presidential power. 106 Professor Bellia has argued that
this was Jackson’s intention—that he had essentially
addressed the concurrence to the political branches. 107 To the
executive branch the message had been prudence. Early
drafts of Jackson’s concurrence carry the implication that
had Jackson still been attorney general, advice to seize the
steel mills would never have been given. 108 Prudence in the
executive meant exercising presidential power in ways that
kept matters out of court, where the forum compelled testing
boundaries and drawing lines. Prudence also counseled the
use of a statutory regime where one was available. More
generally, prudence in the exercise of power entailed
105. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 693–94 (1988) (first quoting United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974); and then quoting Steel Seizure Case,
343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
106. See, e.g., Authority to Use United States Military Forces in Somalia, 16
Op. O.L.C. 8, 10 (1992), reprinted in POWELL, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
ATTORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 14, at 554 (memorandum opinion written by
Timothy E. Flanigan); see also POWELL, THE PRESIDENT AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF,
supra note 64, at 44–45 (arguing that “most lawyers would think” Steel Seizure
“the most relevant case” for settling the president’s unilateral powers to provide
for national security).
107. See Bellia, supra note 13, at 275.
108. Id. at 275–76.
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judgment, reflection, caution, and sensitivity to implications,
and contrasted with decision by “individual will” or
“whim.” 109 Presidential whim would land the government in
court, where judges would feel duty-bound, as institutional
defenders of the rule of law, to give effect to congressional
policy. The message in Jackson’s concurrence to Congress,
then, was not to remain silent, since doing so would invite
unilateralism in cases where the president perceived a
crisis. 110
CONCLUSION:
AFTERLIFE, AUTHORITY, AND THE ROLE OF THE COURT
The “afterlife” of a case is the period when others take up
an opinion and make use of it. The Supreme Court set it
down and gave it life, but we (in a broad sense) took it up and
gave it an afterlife. Lawyers in all three branches and outside
of government, including law teachers in law schools, find a
use for words written by justices. They are constantly
engaged in what I have called “opinion-measuring,” and
since our needs change, our measure of the thing changes as
well. Whereas the life of an opinion depends on the justices
of the Court, its afterlife also depends on us, and what
afterlife it has is a product of the usefulness, goodness, and
legitimacy we see in it. It is the popular component of judgemade constitutional law.
Why was it that Jackson’s concurrence in Steel Seizure
came to have such a prominent afterlife? Perhaps it was an
historical accident—the fact that Cox, Sirica, and Burger
admired Jackson and used his concurrence in the Watergate
cases. In part, it was because Jackson was such a gifted prose
stylist. He could also write with authority, having played an
important role as a presidential legal advisor.

109. On the distinction between “whim” and “discretion” in this context, see
Matthew Steilen, Presidential Whim, 46 OHIO N. U. L. REV. 485, 498–99 (2020).
110. See Bellia, supra note 13, at 275.
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But there’s something else that bears mention, too, and
which touches directly on the question of Supreme Court
reform, with which I began, and the role of the Court in the
separation of powers. Many progressives want a more
minimalist and deferential Court, which leaves collisions
between the branches to a political resolution, as
Frankfurter generally counseled and as Learned Hand
wanted. 111 But by the time of the Steel Seizure Case, at least,
Justice Jackson was comfortable with setting down
something of a system for managing these conflicts. It was
not minimalist at all, but a very general framework. What
value did it have?
In a review of the Supreme Court’s separation of powers
jurisprudence in 1954, shortly after the Steel Seizure Case,
the legal historian Willard Hurst observed that the Supreme
Court’s decisions had actually had little concrete effect on
collisions between the branches. He thought “the practical
influence of judicial review has been much exaggerated and
importance has often been attributed to it for the wrong
reasons.” 112 Where the Court really had effect was “as a
contributor to the symbols and ideas with which we conduct
our politics.” Hurst thought there was as yet little evidence
that this contribution went beyond the “professional wordmen” who filled the agencies of the federal government. 113
But even if we confine our attention to them, the language of
opinions can contribute ideas and bits of rhetoric that can
function as channels for conducting disputes, for
understanding what’s at stake, and for marking the limits
and possible resolutions. Justice Jackson began his opinion
by reflecting on the difficulty these people faced—in
particular the executive advisor, given the “poverty of really
useful and unambiguous authority applicable to concrete

111. See supra note 80.
112. Willard Hurst, Review and the Distribution of National Powers, in
SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW 140, 140 (Edmond Cahn ed., 1954).
113. Id. at 167.
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problems of executive power as they actually present
themselves.” 114 A Court that fails to give this guidance
abjures its symbolic role, and loses an opportunity to channel
and shape future disputes, which helps to ensure they are
resolved within tolerable boundaries.
I think one reason Jackson’s concurrence has had such a
significant afterlife is that it has helped us imagine and
conduct interbranch politics in the national government. Not
all judicial opinions are equivalent in this regard; in some
cases, legal language can be stultifying. It may be too rigid,
categorical, or out of touch, rendering it “unworkable.” 115 An
opinion like Justice Black’s in Steel Seizure simply could not
be applied to the range of cases that presented themselves;
it encouraged the Court either to bow out (political question
doctrine) or to authorize sweeping assertions of power.
Minimalism like the kind favored by Learned Hand would
leave the meaning of Truman’s seizure to history, confining
it to a political and legal context that has long passed away.
An active, expansive, theoretical, eloquent concurrence like
Jackson’s lifted ideas about the operation of government out
of that context for us to use on other occasions as we saw fit.
By giving people in all three branches ideas and a structure
to work with, Jackson fostered the idea that separation of
powers consisted in a linkage and sequence between
departments of government. By being so expansive, he
allowed for the popular authority of the opinion to increase
over time.
Historians have given us reason to suspect this was
Jackson’s intent. But whether it was his intent is really not

114. Steel Seizure Case, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
115. See Bowie & Renan, supra note 2, at 2093–96, 2114. On the virtues of
Jackson’s concurrence as a piece of judicial writing, see Sanford Levinson,
Introduction: Why Select a Favorite Case?, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1195, 1197–98 (1996)
(“For me, Jackson provides a magnificent, inspiring example of how a serious
person wrestles with the difficult problem of preserving some notion of liberal
democracy in a modern world full of horrendous threats and ‘emergencies’ calling
for vigorous response.”).
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the crucial point. The scope of Jackson’s opinion is not settled
by his private intent, but by what use we can find for it,
according to generally prevailing contemporary methods.
Other justices have written opinions with ill intent, or at
least an intent we can no longer support. 116 But here it seems
right to say about the intent of Supreme Court justices what
Frederick Douglass said about the intent of the
Constitution’s Framers with respect to the question of
whether it protected race slavery:
What will the people of America a hundred years hence care about
the intentions of the scriveners who wrote the Constitution? These
men are already gone from us, and in the course of nature were
expected to go from us. They were for a generation, but the
Constitution is for ages. 117

As Douglass saw it, the principal advantage of having a
written constitution was to give the political community
words that it could use, interpreting them for itself in an
effort to achieve the community’s highest goals. When
Douglass said “The Constitution is for ages,” he did not mean
that it was eternal—that we today are bound by the intent of
men from a long-lost age—but that the Constitution is for all
our ages, our present age as well as for their past age, and
that we make it ours by making use of the text as we see fit.
Whatever Justice Jackson’s purpose was, then, in writing his
Steel Seizure concurrence, he gave us words to use, and in so
doing, enabled us to make those words our own.

116. See Bowie & Renan, supra note 2, at 2072–82 (describing Chief Justice
Taft’s aims in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926)).
117. Frederick Douglass, The Constitution of the United States: Is it ProSlavery or Anti-Slavery?, Speech Delivered in Glasgow, Scotland (Mar. 26, 1860),
reprinted in 2 THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 467, 469 (Philip
S. Foner ed., 1950).

